With this riddle, which is an important mind exercise, you can strengthen your muscles for fine-playing, taking into account the interests of each of the different actors in life.
The pirate riddle contains some interesting concepts of game theory in economics, even a good example of a “Nash equilibrium”. You have to solve this pirate riddle by strategizing and taking into account the different motivations of all actors.
Among the pirates he finds a chest with 100 gold coins. They have to share this gold in accordance with piracy laws.
The pirates’ names are Amaro, Bart, Charlotte, Daniel and Eliza. Here are the piracy laws on the sharing of gold:
Amaro, the captain, will offer an idea of how the gold should be distributed, and each pirate will vote yes or no to this proposal.
If this vote results in equal votes and everyone accepts Amaro’s proposal, the gold will be shared according to this rule.
If the no vote is too much, Amaro will be kicked off the deck and the next captain, Bart, will present a new proposal.
Again, if the vote is accepted with equal votes, the gold will be divided according to Bart’s plan. If his plan is rejected, he too will be thrown off the deck.
If Bart’s plan is also rejected, he too will be kicked off the deck and replaced by Charlotte, and if his plan is not accepted, he will be replaced by Daniel and then Eliza.
What can Amaro do to avoid being kicked off the deck and have a certain amount of gold?
Remember: each pirate will want to get as many gold coins as possible!
However, if they don’t cooperate and kick the captains before them just for fun, the situation can turn against them. Pirates are very good at reasoning in these situations and know that others will do the same.
If you’ve thought of your answer so far, let’s think about it together.
Amaro’s first offer to survive is to bribe the other pirates with most of the gold. But perhaps there are better possibilities than this.
Each pirate knows that the other will reason very cleverly, so he will take into account not only the first bid, but also other possibilities in the vote.
Since the captaincy order is predetermined, each pirate can anticipate the other’s moves and develop plans to defeat him.
If we look back at possible scenarios, starting with the ideas that would run through Eliza’s mind last, we realize that Amaro must have bribed the other pirates with most of the gold.
But the next pirates can do the same, and in this case, since the number of pirates will decrease, more gold can be left for each pirate. Can you find a solution for Amaro that will balance all these possibilities?
