When you understand the logic of the “Condorcet paradox/Majority method” proposed by the 18th century French philosopher Marquis de Condorcet, you will think a lot about who the real winner should be.
Since the details of this idea are very extensive, we tried to explain it as plainly as possible with an example.
Let’s assume that we have 4 candidates as in these elections. Let the number of our voters be 65 (representing our total number of voters, 64 million 113 thousand 941).
Let’s call each of these 4 candidates Ali, Ahmet, Ayşe, Mehmet and assume that the election results as follows when our current voting system is used:
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Ali: 18 votes
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Ahmed: 17 votes
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Ayşe: 16 votes
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Mehmet: 14 votes
As you can see, it’s a solid result. In the classical system, Ali wins the election. So, what kind of system does the Condorcet method suggest? What would be the result in this system?
Philosopher Condorcet suggests that voters should vote in order of their preferences from best to worst, rather than voting for a single person.
In other words, if a voter who votes for Ahmet in the classical system does not want Ali to be elected, but is also warm to the election of Ayşe and Mehmet, he cannot weaken Ali’s power because he is not given the right to reflect his views about them at the ballot box.
Let’s take a look at this sample selection made with the Condorcet method. Let’s say the preferences are ordered as follows:
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Candidate preference order of 18 voters who voted for Ali: Ali > Ayşe > Mehmet > Ahmet
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Candidate preference order of 17 voters who voted for Ahmet: Ahmet > Ayşe > Mehmet > Ali
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Candidate preference order of 16 voters who voted for Ayşe: Ayşe > Mehmet > Ahmet > Ali
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Candidate preference order of 14 voters who voted for Mehmet: Mehmet > Ayşe > Ahmet > Ali
As you can see, Ali, who was the 1st in the classical voting, was the last choice of the voters who did not vote for him. So, can this prevent him from winning in the method we mentioned?
Condorcet did not set such a point value, but let’s make the situation a little more concrete for clarity:
Voting power of 2nd preferences 0.75 points
Voting power of 3rd preferences 0.50 points
Let the voting power of the 4th preferences be 0.25 points
Let’s move on to the calculation:
In addition to Ali’s 18 full votes, we will add 47 votes, each of which is 0.25 points, due to the fact that he is the 4th option of the other voters. This makes 47×0.25=11.75 points. When we add to Ali’s 18 full votes, the total vote value becomes 29.75.
Ayşe, on the other hand, took the 3rd place in the classical system by getting 16 full votes, but the number of votes with a power of 0.75 is high, as she was predominantly in the second choice of the other voters in the election where the Condorcet method was applied. He has 46 0.75 votes, which makes 34.5 points. When we add all 16 full votes to this, it makes a total of 50.5.
Thus, 3rd in the classical system, Ayşe, rose to 50.5 votes and became the winner of the election, outperforming 1st Ali, who could only get 29.75 votes in the new system.
In fact, Ahmet with 36.5 points of votes and Mehmet with 42.75 votes surpassed Ali. Ali, the first of the first system, was the last in this system.
In this way, it is ensured that a person with whom the general public is less than satisfied does not take over the administration. This, in turn, relieves radicalization and unrest in society.
In this system, the will of the general public was chosen. In the classical system, the party hated by the general public won the election.
Would you like this system to come?
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